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INTRODUCTION
Public nuisance is taking the modern tort world by storm. Once relegated to the backwaters—a marginal note in the main torts
casebooks, the subject of scant law review articles—the public nuisance cause of action is now front and center in the most vexing legal
controversies of our time:2 global climate change,3 electronic cigarettes,4 COVID-19 work-related harms,5 and the opioid crisis.6 Commentators have trained attention on the hybrid nature of public
nuisance, specifically the public versus private dimension. This Article
focuses on public nuisance’s innovative use as a means of recovering
purely financial losses between non-contracting parties (i.e., “strangers”), in particular where the economic loss rule (ELR) potentially
bars recovery. Framed as such, public nuisance could emerge as the
quintessential business tort of the 21st century.
In the realm of business torts resulting in purely financial losses,
plaintiffs can simultaneously allege claims for negligent infliction of
economic losses and public nuisance. The recently published Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm calls for a drastic
curtailment of the scenarios in which negligent infliction of economic
loss is a viable cause of action between strangers.7 At the same time,
2. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 743, 743 (2003) (“The tort of public nuisance has awakened from a centuries-long slumber.”); see also Steven Czak, Public Nuisance Claims After ConAgra, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1061,
1075 (2019) (“Whether as a means of addressing the opioid crisis, gun violence, or the hazards of
lead paint, states and communities have come to view public nuisance as an avenue of resolving
serious social health and safety issues.” (internal citations omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Public Nuisance Claims and Climate
Change Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Tiffany Kary & Jef Feeley, Juul Accused by School Districts of Creating Vaping
‘Nuisance’, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2019, 5:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201910-07/juul-accused-by-school-districts-of-creating-vaping-nuisance (last updated Oct. 8, 2019,
10:15 AM).
5. See, e.g., Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1234
(W.D. Mo. 2020); Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., 2020 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 465 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24,
2020).
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Purcell, Settling High: A Common Law Public Nuisance Response to the
Opioid Epidemic, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 135, 135 (2018).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 1, 7 (A.L.I. 2020) [hereinafter RTT: LEH].
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the Third Restatement presents public nuisance as an exception to the
ELR’s presumptive barring of negligence claims, recognizing that
“[t]he social and private costs of a public nuisance can . . . be large,”
and that therefore “[a]llowing certain classes of private parties a right
of action can . . . usefully deter repetition of the wrong.”8
The Third Restatement’s approach—essentially to shoehorn negligence causes of action between non-contracting parties for purely financial losses into public nuisance—is flawed. As a doctrinal matter,
to recover damages under public nuisance a private plaintiff must
demonstrate “special injury,” which has been ubiquitously interpreted
by courts as requiring an injury “distinct in kind” (rather than simply
in degree) from that affecting the general public.9 Commercial fishermen have been one of the few classes of private plaintiffs to prevail
notwithstanding the constraints of the “special injury” rule, giving the
impression that tort law simply holds commercial fisherman especially
close to its heart.10 As a pragmatic matter, it is not at all clear why
forcing (or even encouraging) plaintiffs to cram their claims for negligently inflicted purely financial losses into the “impenetrable jungle”11
of a public nuisance cause of action is either a necessary or effective
means to combat the fear of unlimited liability that undergirds the
ELR for negligence claims. As a theoretical matter, foreclosing actions for negligently inflicted financial losses generally—with exception only for those whose “distinct in kind” injuries arise from a
violation of a public right actionable under public nuisance—could fall
dramatically short of the goal of “usefully deter[ing] repetition of the
wrong.”12
This Article proposes a new approach to reconciling the torts of
negligence and public nuisance, centered on the “channeling” or enforcement rationale: namely, deputizing a class of significantly impacted individuals or entities who can sue to force the tortfeasor to
internalize the social costs of its activities. The use of tort law as a
device for minimizing accident costs by channeling scarce resources to
8. Id. § 8.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (A.L.I. 2020) (“In order to recover damages
in an individual action for a public nuisance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different
from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general
public that was the subject of interference.”).
10. See generally Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755, 779–81 (2001).
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984).
12. RTT: LEH § 8; see also Antolini, supra note 10, at 761 (noting the paradox of the special
injury rule is that “the broader the injury to the community and the more the plaintiff’s injury
resembles an injury also suffered by other members of the public, the less likely that the plaintiff
can bring a public nuisance lawsuit[ ]”).
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their most efficient use is foundational. Nonetheless, as a practical
matter, the need to grapple with this issue in the realm of purely financial losses outside a narrow band of intentional business torts was
(perhaps) to date not justified by cost internalization/deterrence principles given that victims with physical injuries and property damages
could generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys
general (including on behalf of the more remotely injured entities suffering purely financial losses). But, where the prospect of physical
bodily injuries and property damage is attenuated, this cost-internalization function is especially important to deter excessively risky conduct likely to lead to significant financial losses. Moreover, the
calculus may be shifting in an age of global financial crises, escalation
of digital and informational harms, and growing sense that the societal
harms of the 21st century involve risky conduct leading to purely financial harms. Where there are diffuse, widespread harms raising concomitant concerns of under- and over-deterrence, a new “channeling”
paradigm is necessary to guide courts in fashioning the metes and
bounds of public nuisance as the quintessentially modern business
tort.
I. PUBLIC NUISANCE

AS AN

END RUN AROUND

THE

ELR

FOR

NEGLIGENCE
Public nuisance has emerged with renewed verve as a potentially
viable end run around the formidable ELR which limits recovery in
torts involving purely financial losses, unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage. In its broadest formulation by courts, the
ELR amounts to a “categorical refusal to award tort damages for pure
economic loss.”13 But this formulation masks the underlying reality
that there are several different ELRs: products liability,14 contracting
13. See Nazareth Int’l, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Corp., 2005 WL 1704793, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 2005)
(“The economic loss rule is defined as ‘the principle that a plaintiff cannot sue in tort to recover
for purely monetary loss—as opposed to physical injury or property damage—caused by the
defendant.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Primary Color Sys. Corp. v. Willwork, Inc., 95
N.E.3d 300, 300 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 14, 2017) (“ ‘[P]urely economic losses are unrecoverable in
tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage.’ ” (quoting
FMR Corp. v. Bos. Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 902, 903 (Mass. 1993)).
14. The products liability ELR bars plaintiffs from recovery when a product disappoints their
economic expectations. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic Loss
Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (2016) (“The economic loss rule in products cases rears its head in the mid-1960s—not coincidentally, right at the triumphant moment
for strict products liability and the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code’s set
of warranties between retailers and buyers (i.e., parties in privity of contract)—to reassert the
contract-tort border, circumscribe the strict liability rule, and defend privity’s last bastion.”).
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parties, third-party, and the “stranger” ELRs.15 This Article homes in
on the “stranger” ELR, which bars recovery in the context of noncontracting parties who lack a “special relationship” and who suffer
purely financial losses as a result of negligence.16
In recent times, litigants have framed claims for recovery for financial losses as public nuisance (as opposed to negligence) at least in
part to evade the stranger ELR.17 Moreover, the newly minted Third
Restatement has unwittingly fueled this approach through its explicit
positioning of public nuisance as a carve-out to its broadly articulated
“stranger” ELR.
A. The ELR Does Not Apply To Public Nuisance
Historically, public nuisance stood apart from the purview of the
ELR.18 But neither courts nor scholars have devoted much effort to
explain why.19 Thus, as the ELR took wind and expanded far beyond
its origins in products liability cases, some courts have applied it categorically to public nuisance claims and, in so doing, barred all recovery if the plaintiff has not suffered physical injury or property
damage.20 In some sense, this is the ELR “swallowing” the public nui15. See Catherine M. Sharkey, In Search of the Cheapest Cost Avoider: Another View of the
Economic Loss Rule, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1019–29 (2018) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Cheapest
Cost Avoider]; see also Ward Farnsworth, The Economic Loss Rule, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 545,
546–49 (2016) (distinguishing four distinct rules: products liability ELR; a services contract ELR;
a third party contractual ELR; and a vicarious ELR); Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to NonStatutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 714 (2006); Vincent R. Johnson, The
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 534–35
(2009); Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813,
813 (2006).
16. Sharkey, Cheapest Cost Avoider, supra note 15, at 1019–29.
17. See Czak, supra note 2, at 1075 (“[I]n the 1970s and ’80s, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to
push the traditional boundaries of nuisance, as the tort was vaguely defined and provided a
means of avoiding potentially fatal shortcomings of other torts, such as . . . the inability to recover for purely economic losses.”).
18. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 529–32, 531 n.37 (listing nuisance among other causes of
actions as “well-recognized” exceptions to any economic loss rule); John T. Nockleby, When
Losses Are Too Big: Evaluating the Economic Loss Doctrine in California, 53 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
409, 415–16 (2020).
19. See, e.g., In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1480 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(merely stating, in conclusory fashion, that “[i]t is clear that the economic loss doctrine is not
applicable to public nuisance claims . . .”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Fed Ins. Co. v.
Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993). Peter Benson has argued that the distinction is defensible due to the type of interest damaged. Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure
Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 855 n.122 (2009).
20. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1139–44 (Ill. 2004) (applying the
economic loss rule to bar recovery for solely economic losses in public nuisance); Sample v.
Monsanto Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that the economic loss rule
applies in public nuisance cases, and absent physical or property damage, recovery is barred by
the economic loss rule); Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL202.txt

436

unknown

Seq: 6

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:52

[Vol. 70:431

sance doctrine. Courts adopting this approach reason that the ELR
applies to all torts, and since public nuisance is a tort, the ELR should
apply to bar recovery in public nuisance for purely financial losses.21
To be sure, notwithstanding the priority in tort given to physical
bodily injury and property damage, if the ELR is articulated as “no
liability in tort for purely financial losses,” it is overbroad. Few would
question the viability of fraud or intentional misrepresentation actions
for purely financial losses; relatively few question the existence of tortious interference with business. Thus, in jurisdictions that would otherwise apply the ELR to all unintentional torts, one strategic
approach by litigants is to frame public nuisance as an intentional (as
opposed to negligence or strict liability-based) tort so as to withstand
the ELR.22
A second approach focuses on taming the ever-expanding unprincipled spread of the ELR, arguing that the rule should be confined to its
origins in products liability suits or, if extended, only to suits involving
contracting parties. Thus, for example, in Tiara Condo Association,
Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos, the Florida Supreme Court was persuaded by this critique and limited the ELR to its origins in the realm
of products liability.23 The court warned of the danger of the expansive “no-duty” ELR and refused to extend it even to the realm of
contracting parties.24 Other jurisdictions have toed the line at contracting parties, refusing to apply the brittle no-duty rule in the realm
of “stranger” negligence situations.25
Pilgrims Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 242 (Utah 2009) (applying the economic loss rule to public
nuisance claims and barring such claims if for solely economic losses).
21. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019, 1030 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Were we to allow plaintiffs recovery for their losses under a public nuisance theory we would
permit recovery for injury to the type of interest that, as we have already explained, we have
consistently declined to protect. Nuisance, as Dean Prosser has explained, is not a separate tort
subject to rules of its own but instead is a type of damage.” (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 87 (4th ed. 1971)).
22. In Ohio, the ELR applies to “qualified” public nuisances (negligence), not to “absolute”
public nuisances (intentional). See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 863
F.3d 474, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that, under Ohio law, the economic loss rule foreclosed
the City’s qualified public nuisance claim but not its absolute nuisance claim).
23. 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 2013) (holding that the economic loss rule applies only in the
products liability context where there are economic losses stemming from a defective product,
and that product only damages itself and no other property).
24. Id. at 402, 407 (noting that some courts have barred recovery of solely economic damages
“where a defendant has not committed a breach of [tort] duty apart from a breach of contract”
(the “no-duty” economic loss rule), but ultimately declining to extend the ELR beyond cases
involving products liability).
25. See, e.g., In re Opioid Litig., 2018 WL 3115102, at *27 (No. 4000/2017) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(stating that the economic loss rule only bars tort actions between contracting parties, and because there is no contract here, there is no economic loss rule issue); City of Boston v. Purdue
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B. The Restatement Approach Fuels the ELR/ Public Nuisance
Dichotomy
The Third Restatement maps out an approach to the ELR that, on
first impression, may seem limited to the realm of contracting parties.
But on further study, the Third Restatement embraces a very broad
“stranger” ELR. That said, even its broad articulation of the stranger
ELR contemplates a carve-out for public nuisance.
The Third Restatement begins in Section 1 with the principle that
“[a]n actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of
economic losses on another.”26 Then, in Section 3, it narrowly defines
the “economic loss rule” as a contracting parties ELR.27 Section 7,
however, embraces a broad “stranger” ELR (in principle, if not in
name) that bars plaintiffs from recovering for financial losses caused
by damage to property that plaintiffs do not own.28 Notwithstanding
this breadth, Section 8 contains a clear carve-out for public nuisance,
with special emphasis on the traditional “special injury” rule: “An actor whose wrongful conduct harms or obstructs a public resource or
public property is subject to liability for resulting economic losses if the
claimant’s losses are distinct in kind from those suffered by members
of the affected community in general.”29 So long as a plaintiff can
prove special injury that is distinct from that suffered by the public at
large, she can recover purely financial losses stemming from infringements on public rights, evading the Section 7 “stranger” ELR.
The Third Restatement’s approach to business disputes involving
purely financial losses—sharply curtailing negligence actions but allowing a potential escape hatch via public nuisance—has thereby fueled litigants’ strategy of using public nuisance as an end run around
the ELR in negligence. The “special injury” requirement, moreover,
has emerged as the core doctrinal distinction between a viable public
nuisance claim and a barred negligent interference with economic relations tort.30
Pharma, 2020 WL 416406, at *8 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 2020) (The economic loss rule should only apply
in the contracting-parties context, and thus was not applicable to the opioid case here.).
26. RTT: LEH § 1.
27. Id. § 3.
28. Id. § 7 cmt. a (embracing stranger economic loss rule, as elaborated in 532 Madison Ave.
Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y. 2001) and Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927)).
29. Id. § 8 (emphasis added).
30. To be actionable as a public nuisance, the defendant’s conduct must infringe upon a public
right. Professor Richard Epstein would limit such actions to their historical roots—namely, intrusions upon public property, such as roads, bridges, or bodies of water. See Amicus Curiae Brief
of Competitive Enterprise Institute at 3, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, Appeal No. 118,474 (Okla. Oct. 22, 2020) (arguing that a “basic error in the district court’s under-
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The ELR for negligence causes of action and the special injury rule
for public nuisance actions are not typically discussed side-by-side,31
but the resurgence of public nuisance actions in the context of business or financial losses has provided occasion for courts to consider
the doctrines together. Part II explores the consensus view that has
emerged that these seemingly disparate doctrines are united by a
shared underlying justification of limiting liability in the realm of financial losses.
II. LIMITATION

OF

LIABILITY RATIONALES

The conventional justification for the “stranger” ELR is the need to
protect against unlimited and disproportionate liability on the part of
negligent tortfeasors, who must pay for physical injuries and property
damage but not purely financial losses. Similarly, several courts called
upon to consider public nuisance actions in the context of business
losses have construed the special injury requirement—mandating that
the injury alleged be distinct in kind, not simply degree, from that
afflicting the general community—in like manner, as a necessary doctrine to limit potentially limitless liability. While the ELR requires
personal injury or property damage for a negligence action to go forward, the special injury rule does not limit public nuisance recovery to
these two types of harms.32 Nonetheless, to the extent that courts do
allow for public nuisance actions notwithstanding the ELR, they typically deploy the special injury requirement to cabin nuisance claims in
order to prevent unlimited liability. This rationale, standing alone,
does not explain why the line for recovery should be drawn at “disstanding of the public nuisance doctrine” was that it strayed “[f]ar from its origins in common
rights of the public to land and water”). But most courts (and statutes) have embraced broader
conceptions of public resources to include air quality as well as general public health and safety.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (A.L.I 2020) (“Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include . . . whether the
conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation[.]”). See also OKLA.
STAT. tit. 50, § 1 (2019) (“A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform
a duty, which act or omission . . . [a]nnoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or
safety of others . . .”).
31. A notable exception is Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, a classic oil spill public nuisance case, wherein the court explicitly recognized the danger of “permitting the use of
nuisance theory to skirt the [stranger economic loss rule].” 752 F.2d 1019, 1030 (5th Cir. 1985);
see also Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle
Theory”, 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 567–71 (2002) (“[W]here a normatively justifiable plaintiff
class, say of primary victims . . . is ascertainable, liability to them may be allowed in the tort of
public nuisance and yet denied to those whose economic loss is a ripple effect of that suffered by
the plaintiff class . . .”).
32. But see Robinson v. Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 467 So. 2d 911, 918 (Miss. 1985)
(defining special injury to require a personal injury or property damage).
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tinct in kind” injuries. With courts’ overriding concern for limitless
liability (and thus over-deterrence) in the realm of financial losses,
potential under-deterrence is left unaddressed. Moreover, in practice,
judicial outcomes are inconsistent and defy principled justification.
A. The “Stranger” ELR in Negligence
The conventional view of the “stranger” ELR is that it functions as
a rather blunt line-drawing exercise necessary in order to keep tort
liability within feasible bounds and in particular to stave off the specter of indeterminate and unlimited liability.
The New York Court of Appeals articulated this dominant approach in 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr.,
Inc., where the court denied recovery for business interruption losses
suffered by a delicatessen when a building collapsed due to the negligence of a developer, leading to closure of all foot traffic along a fifteen block stretch that included the deli:
As is readily apparent, an indeterminate group in the affected areas
thus may have provable financial losses directly traceable to the two
construction-related collapses, with no satisfactory way geographically to distinguish among those who have suffered purely economic
losses. In such circumstances, limiting the scope of defendants’ duty
to those who have, as a result of these events, suffered personal
injury or property damage—as historically courts have done—affords a principled basis for reasonably apportioning liability.33

Most recently, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed this modern articulation of the “stranger” ELR in Southern California Gas Co.
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,34 a case involving a natural
gas leak that immobilized a suburban community of some 30,000 people who suffered a variety of illnesses, including headaches, respiratory problems, and dizziness.35 The first tier of impacted victims were
residents who were moved to different locations to get away from the
stench.36 The issue posed in the case concerned the next tier of im33. 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001) (internal citations omitted); id. at 1101 (“This restriction is necessary to avoid exposing defendants to unlimited liability to an indeterminate class of
persons conceivably injured by any negligence in a defendant’s act.”).
34. 441 P.3d 881, 885 (Cal. 2019).
35. The court elaborated:
In October 2015, a leak happened—and people noticed. An uncontrolled flow of natural gas from the Aliso Facility coated nearby neighborhoods in an oily mist. At its peak,
the leak released some 55 tons of natural gas every hour. Porter Ranch residents reported unpleasant odors, headaches, dizziness, and respiratory problems. In addition to
those symptoms, students at local schools complained of nosebleeds and vomiting.
Id. at 883.
36. Id. at 883–84 (“[T]he Los Angeles County health department directed SoCalGas to establish a relocation program available to Porter Ranch residents who lived within a five-mile radius
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pacted parties, namely those merchants who lost the patronage of
those people who were removed from the site. Justice MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar formulated the issue: “We must decide if local
businesses—none of which allege they suffered personal injury or
property damage—may recover in negligence for income lost because
of the leak.”37 In denying recovery to these merchants, Justice Cuéllar
was frank about drawing an arbitrary line as a matter of policy in order to provide “[m]eaningful limits on tort liability,” which are “crucial to the functioning of our economy and of our courts.”38 Justice
Cuéllar approvingly quoted 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Food’s explanation that denying recovery for purely economic losses “affords a
principled basis for reasonably apportioning liability.”39 Moreover,
Justice Cuéllar noted that his ruling aligned with the predominant
view: “Concerned about line-drawing problems and potentially overwhelming liability, courts across the country have rejected recovery
for purely economic losses stemming from man-made calamity . . . .”40
B. The “Special Injury” Requirement in Public Nuisance
In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods,41 the New York Court of Appeals separately addressed claims for negligent infliction of economic
losses and public nuisance. The court extensively analyzed the application of the ELR to the negligence claim but did not mention it during
its public nuisance analysis.42 By implication, then, the court suggested
that the ELR does not apply to public nuisance claims, thereby encouraging the “end run” strategy and foreshadowing the approach espoused by Section 8 of the Third Restatement. The court nonetheless
held that the plaintiffs failed to show a special injury and that therefore their public nuisance claim likewise failed.43
With respect to the special injury analysis, the New York Court of
Appeals emphasized the need to limit potentially unlimited liability
given the number of potential plaintiffs.44 Indeed, this appeared to be
the dispositive factor in terms of rejecting liability for public nuisance,
of the leak site . . . About 15,000 people were relocated in total, scattering to locations dozens—
and in some cases hundreds—of miles away.”).
37. Id. at 883.
38. Id. at 896.
39. Id. at 889 (quoting 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750
N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001)).
40. Id.
41. 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (N.Y. 2001).
42. See id. at 1103.
43. See id. at 1104.
44. Id. at 1101.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL202.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

13-DEC-21

2021] PUBLIC NUISANCE AS MODERN BUSINESS TORT

10:52

441

given that so many plaintiffs suffered some kind of economic loss,
from the “taxi driver” to the “hot dog vendor” to the “law firm.”45
The court further reasoned that “[w]hile the degree of harm to the
named plaintiffs may have been greater than to the window washer,
per diem employee or neighborhood resident unable to reach the
premises, in kind the harm was the same.”46
Several courts have taken this approach to reconciling claims for
public nuisance and negligent infliction of economic losses. Thus, to
the extent that courts have considered the two separate lines of jurisprudence together, the unifying feature tends to be the use of the
“special injury” requirement as a limitation on liability. As one court
explained:
It is clear that the special harm requirement is intended to serve the
same purpose as the economic loss doctrine: to limit liability arising
from an event. Public nuisances, by definition, affect many people.
If every person or entity injured from a public nuisance could recover economic or even property damages, liability could be exorbitant; thus, only those plaintiffs who suffer special harm may
recover.47

Moreover, to the limited extent the Third Restatement has posited a
theoretical reconciliation across these separate jurisprudential lines, it
too has embraced the conventional limitation of liability rationale.
Similar to the “stranger” ELR, the “special injury” public nuisance
requirement is designed to resist the pressures of potentially indeterminate and unlimited liability.48 The tort law professor amici in Southern California Gas Co. embraced the reasoning from the Third
Restatement:
45. Id. at 1104–05.
46. Id. at 1105 (citing Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 145 A.D.2d 291 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), which is a
classic commercial fishermen/pollution case). The court did acknowledge that a complete “loss
of livelihood” would be so severe as to justify finding special injury. Id.
47. In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Fed Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also City of Chicago v. Beretta, 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1142 (Ill. 2004) (noting that both economic loss
rule and “special injury” requirement of public nuisance are designed to limit liability and holding that “[p]laintiffs in the present case can neither avail themselves of the standing conferred
upon individuals under section 821C(2) of the Restatement on the basis of having suffered a
particular harm, nor escape the strictures of the Moorman doctrine [the Economic Loss Rule],
because they have pleaded no injury to person or property.”); Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984) (analyzing public nuisance claim
separately from the economic loss rule, but finding that there is no special injury because if all
the businesses on the island are affected, the injury by definition cannot be special).
48. RTT: LEH § 8 cmt. c (“Recovery in tort by everyone who is harmed by a public nuisance
would raise the characteristic problems that give rise to the rules of this Chapter. Defendants
would be subject to potentially massive and unpredictable liabilities . . . .”).
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[D]ecisions about recovery are best made by asking if liability
would cause the problems that the requirement of special injury is
meant to address: whether permitting the plaintiffs’ claim would
multiply the amount of litigation or the defendant’s liabilities unduly, and whether plaintiffs who are allowed to sue can be separated in a principled fashion from those who are not.49

C. The Limits of Limitation of Liability Rationales
To date, the conventional justification for the special injury public
nuisance requirement is that it serves a function akin to the “stranger”
ELR in negligence—namely, as a necessary limitation on liability. But
the underlying limitation of liability rationale does not provide a principled way to distinguish which class of victims, among all persons
generally affected and injured or impaired, should be allowed to come
forward, whether in negligence or public nuisance.50 For example, it is
nearly universally established—but not satisfactorily justified—that a
fisherman may recover for the contamination of a quarry or wharf
while the numerous businesses which suffer a decline in business because customers avoid the polluted area cannot.51
In crafting the “stranger” ELR and special injury requirement, the
Third Restatement’s overriding concern with unlimited liability ensures that there is not over-deterrence. But the corresponding risk of
under-deterrence looms large. Nor does it make sense for recovery of
purely financial losses to turn on whether the claim is framed as negligence or public nuisance. The Third Restatement’s invocation of the
potentially high “social and private costs of a public nuisance”52
hardly suffices—after all, negligently inflicted economic harm can be
49. Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Amicus Curiae Brief of California
Tort Law Scholars in Support of Affirmance at 17, In re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases, 441 P.3d 881
(Cal. 2019) (No. S246669) (quoting RTT: LEH § 8 cmt. c.). The amici elaborate:
In sum, in deciding whether a plaintiff suffered a special injury under the public nuisance rule a court should balance the need for liability to “provide appropriate compensation for [the plaintiff’s] losses and usefully deter repetition of the wrong,” against
the concern not to impose on the defendant “liabilities . . . out of proportion to [its]
culpability;” the concern not to subject defendants to “potentially massive and unpredictable liabilities”; and the concern to avoid “lawsuits large and unwieldy in number
and in character.” A court should also consider “whether plaintiffs who are allowed to
sue can be separated in a principled fashion from those who are not.”
Id. at 19.
50. RTT: LEH § 8 cmt. e (A class of victims must be identified that is “sufficiently distinct to
allow principled separation” from all persons generally affected and injured or impaired in their
daily life by the public nuisance at issue, and the special injury rule achieves that purpose.).
51. Id. cmt. d; Application for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Amicus Curiae Brief of
California Tort Law Scholars in Support of Affirmance at 21–24, In re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases,
441 P.3d 881 (Cal. 2019) (No. S246669).
52. RTT: LEH § 8 cmt. b.
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quite severe in its consequences, and not every public nuisance action
features such high costs.53
Several questions prod us in the direction of a new approach: why,
in practice, should fishermen be “favorites” of the law? Why not subject both negligence and public nuisance plaintiffs to the same set of
channeling considerations rather than force all plaintiffs into the public nuisance box? What if public nuisance were reframed as a new species of business tort, as opposed to an ad hoc or strategic end run
around the ELR? Centered on a “channeling” rationale, this Article’s
proposed approach is that the public nuisance special injury rule
deputizes a subclass of significantly impacted individuals or entities to
enforce against negligent conduct leading to widespread financial
losses.
III. “CHANNELING”

OR

ENFORCEMENT RATIONALES

Unlike the limiting liability rationale, the “channeling” or enforcement rationale supports the optimal deterrence goal of tort law: taking
into account both over- and under-deterrence concerns. It also provides a coherent framework for reconciling public nuisance with the
ELR in negligence. Moreover, the channeling rationale has deep historical roots in the realm of business torts leading to purely financial
losses. And, from a modern perspective, it links the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser rule in antitrust with the special injury requirement for
public nuisance.54
A. Reconciling Public Nuisance “Special Injury” with the
“Stranger” ELR
The channeling or enforcement rationale provides a unified approach to reconciling public nuisance with the ELR.
1. Setting the Scene: Paradigmatic Cases
To begin with the current state of affairs, there are cases in which
courts hold that the ELR would bar recovery, but the public nuisance
framework allows recovery. The most obvious example is when a particular person or group of people suffers unique or disproportionate
53. The Third Restatement approach denies recovery to every plaintiff suffering even the most
severe purely economic harm stemming from an unintentional violation of a private right, but it,
in theory, would allow recovery to a specially, though potentially minimally, economically-affected victim of an unintentional violation of a public right.
54. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (holding that indirect purchasers who
did not buy a product directly from an alleged violator lack standing to sue for money damages
under antitrust law).
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economic harm—public nuisance would allow them to recover, but a
broad ELR would not.55
Consider the classic bridge closure case, where a defendant negligently destroys a bridge, cutting off businesses on one side from their
customers, resulting in lost profits. This is a case that would come out
differently under the conventional ELR and public nuisance
frameworks. The viability of a business’s public nuisance claim alleging severe economic harm resulting from loss of access to its premises
by its customers would rise and fall with the special injury inquiry,
whereas no plaintiff suffering purely economic harms would be able to
recover in negligence under the Third Restatement’s ELR.
These claims should rise or fall together—the business’s ability to
recover should not be contingent on whether the case is framed as
negligence or public nuisance. Consider in that regard how commercial fishermen are typically allowed to recover their purely financial
losses after a negligently inflicted oil spill. The so-called “commercial
fisherman’s exception” to the ELR—its scope as well as its underlying
rationale—has bedeviled this small, but significant (given the frequency of oil spills) corner of the law. Some courts reach this result via
public nuisance due to the fishermen suffering special injury; others
via the “special relationship” or affirmative duty exception to the
ELR in negligence. The two frameworks ought to be reconciled via
the channeling rationale, not, as courts conventionally do, based on
line-drawing given concerns about limitless liability.
a. Business losses due to bridge closure
In Aikens v. Debow,56 the plaintiff, a motel and restaurant, brought
a negligence action against a truck driver and the truck driver’s employer after the truck driver damaged a bridge, leading to its closure,
which caused the motel and restaurant to lose business profits. The
court held that the plaintiffs would only recover for economic losses
where there is: 1) physical damage; 2) property damage; 3) a contractual relationship between the parties; or 4) a “special relationship”
between the parties based on the foreseeability of both the particular
55. Massachusetts, for example, has a very broad economic loss rule: “ ‘purely economic losses
are unrecoverable in tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or property
damage.’ ” Primary Color Sys. Corp. v. Willwork, Inc., 95 N.E.3d 300, 300 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec.
14, 2017). Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 346 (2017) (“[T]he extent to which the [stranger] economic loss rule serves as a formidable barrier to credit card data security breach cases
depends upon the underlying state law; in particular, whether a state adopts the majority or
minority position on the rule, as well as how it defines various exceptions thereto.”).
56. 541 S.E.2d 576, 579 (W. Va. 2000).
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plaintiff and particular injury as well as whether the plaintiff “is affected differently from society in general.”57
It is striking that the Aikens court defines the special relationship
necessary for the imposition of negligence liability in “special injury”
terms (by using a comparative analysis of the plaintiff’s harms versus
those of the community), but nonetheless eschews that its analysis
should in any way reconcile with public nuisance. Indeed, the court
goes out of its way to state that its reasoning in this case “does not
encompass, and has no effect upon . . . nuisance law.”58
The Aikens court also specifically discusses that the reason for this
special relationship limitation for negligence claims is a concern about
unlimited liability:
This Court’s obligation is to draw a line beyond which the law will
not extend its protection in tort, and to declare, as a matter of law,
that no duty exists beyond that court-created line. It is not a matter
of protection of a certain class of defendants; nor is it a matter of
championing the causes of a certain class of plaintiffs. It is a question of public policy. Each segment of society will suffer injustice,
whether situated as plaintiff or defendant, if there are no finite
boundaries to liability and no confines within which the rights of
plaintiffs and defendants can be determined.59

In Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher,60 storeowners sued a barge owner
after the barge collided with a drawbridge, resulting in obstruction of
the bridge that linked storeowners to many of their customers. The
court held that the case could proceed under the public nuisance
framework, even though it would be barred by the ELR if brought as
either a negligence or private nuisance claim:
We recognize the wisdom of the general rule which denies recovery
for negligently caused economic harm. However, not all negligent
acts give rise to a public nuisance, or more particularly, to an obstruction of a public way. In light of the degree of harm required for
an obstruction to amount to a public nuisance, and the dependence
of businesses and their customers on access to business establishments, we conclude that recovery may be warranted in some
cases.61

The court justified recovery in the public nuisance context by looking to the severity of the financial losses:62
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.
444 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Mass. 1983).
Id. at 373.
Id.
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Our old rule [which severely limited public nuisance claims to those
with either 1) physical harm to the plaintiff’s property or 2) obstruction of a public way which cut off immediate access to a public highway or river] has the advantage of avoiding a multitude of suits by
setting up a clear and restrictive line of demarcation between special and general damages. While such a clear line also has a certain
theoretical appeal, we conclude that its clarity does not compensate
for the fact that it precludes any claim, even in cases where an established business may have been virtually destroyed . . . Accordingly, we hold that an established business may state a claim in
nuisance for severe economic harm resulting from loss of access to
its premises by its customers.63

Instead of limiting public nuisance recovery to either physical damage
or the destruction or obstruction of a public way cutting off access to a
highway or waterway (as was historically the case), the court reasoned
that the requirement of “severe economic harm” would sufficiently
cabin liability.
b. Commercial fishermen’s business losses following oil or
chemical spills
In Burgess v. M/V Tamano,64 an oil tanker struck an outcropping,
leading to an oil spill in the surrounding bay. Numerous plaintiffs—
including commercial fishermen, commercial clam diggers, and businesses on the local beach—brought tort claims for financial losses.65
The court dismissed the claims of the motel owners, grocery stores,
and other local businesses who claimed loss of profits as a result of
reduced tourism due to the oil spill, but allowed the claims of commercial fishermen and clam diggers to proceed.66 In finding that the
commercial fishermen and clam diggers suffered “special injury,” the
court relied on the fact that these plaintiffs directly used the harmed
entities (in this case, fish and clams), whereas the hotels and local
businesses suffered “indirect” harm.67 The court also engaged in an
analysis of the severity of the harm, and the comparative harm of the
fishermen related to the community.68 According to the court, fishermen and clam diggers are dependent on the fish and clams for their
63. Id. at 372.
64. 370 F. Supp. 247, 248 (D. Me. 1973).
65. Id. at 249.
66. Id. at 250–51.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 250 (“It would be an incongruous result for the Court to say that a man engaged in
commercial fishing or clamming, and dependent thereon for his livelihood, who may have had
his business destroyed by the tortious act of another, should be denied any right to recover for
his pecuniary loss on the ground that his injury is no different in kind from that sustained by the
general public.”).
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livelihood, which could be destroyed by the oil spill.69 By contrast, the
motel’s injury is the same type of injury suffered by the community.70
There are myriad similar cases in which commercial fishermen successfully recover business losses via public nuisance claims.71
In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,72 the court reasoned that the ELR
would apply to fishermen bringing a public nuisance claim after an oil
spill, but the special relationship exception allowed the fishermen to
recover under negligence for their purely economic losses. In determining whether there was a sufficient special relationship, the Oppen
court looked to “the foreseeability of harm . . . , the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.”73 The court noted that foreseeability was the “crucial determinant” among the factors, and found that “[t]he defendants
understood the risks of their business and should reasonably have
foreseen the scope of its responsibilities.”74 Finding that the other factors and a “cheapest cost avoider” analysis also weighed in favor of
finding a duty of care, the court held that “the defendants are under a
duty to commercial fishermen to conduct their drilling and production
in a reasonably prudent manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life.”75
The court mentioned that its negligence holding was not foreclosed
by the fact that the defendant’s actions might also constitute a public
nuisance76 but nonetheless, the opinion ends on a word of caution:
69. Id.
70. Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 251.
71. See, e.g., Leo v. Gen. Elec., Co., 145 A.D.2d 291, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (granting
recovery to commercial fishermen against polluter of leaked chemicals in Hudson River given
the special nature of their harm, namely extremely severe economic harm); Carson v. Hercules
Powder Co., 402 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Ark. 1966) (allowing recovery for public nuisance where local
fisherman’s livelihood was threatened by pollution of the river leading to the destruction of the
local fishing industry).
72. 501 F.2d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 566 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)).
74. Id. at 568–69 (“Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or
an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in
every case.”).
75. Id. at 569–70. See also Sharkey, Cheapest Cost Avoider, supra note 15, at 1042 (“While
acknowledging that ‘fixing the identity of the best or cheapest cost-avoider is more difficult than
might be imagined,’ the court articulated several relevant factors: (1) excluding as cost-avoiders
those who ‘could avoid accident costs only at an extremely high expense’; (2) evaluating administrative costs on each party; (3) avoiding imposing costs on activities unrelated to the accident;
and (4) allocating the loss to the ‘party who can best correct any error in allocation.’ ” (quoting
Oppen, 501 F.2d at 569–70)).
76. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 570.
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Nothing said in this opinion is intended to suggest . . . that every
decline in the general commercial activity of every business in the
Santa Barbara area following the occurrences of 1969 constitutes a
legally cognizable injury for which the defendants may be responsible. The plaintiffs in the present action lawfully and directly make
use of a resource of the sea, viz. its fish, in the ordinary course of
their business.77

The court also stressed that the “injury here asserted by the plaintiff is
a pecuniary loss of a particular and special nature, limited to the class
of commercial fishermen,” which is notably different from the injury
suffered by those in the community who simply want to take their
boats out for an “‘occasional Sunday piscatorial pleasure.’”78
Many of the factors that courts rely upon in finding an affirmative
duty in negligence clearly overlap with the special injury public nuisance factors. As situating Burgess and Oppen side-by-side shows, the
special injury (Burgess) and special relationship (Oppen) considerations invoked by courts are often the same, and are deployed for a
common purpose, namely to limit liability. As this Article aims to
demonstrate, each of these doctrines might be readily reframed pursuant to a unified framework based on a channeling rationale.
2. Reframing the Doctrines Based on “Channeling”
a. The “Special Injury” Public Nuisance Requirement Revisited
To date, although courts nearly ubiquitously apply the same formulation of the “special injury” requirement—namely that injuries alleged must be different in kind, not simply degree, to warrant
recovery—there is little rhyme or reason to the results reached under
this approach.79 Instead, it seems that the underlying rationale of limiting liability sometimes (but not always) rears its head to cut off
recovery.
The Third Restatement defends fishermen’s recovery via public nuisance claims by arguing that fishermen “are the class of victims most
immediately and obviously affected by contamination of a waterway,
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 260 (9th Cir. 1973)).
79. Compare Overcash v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 614 S.E.2d 619, 622 (S.C. 2005)
(holding that personal injuries cannot qualify as special injuries), with Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“When the public nuisance causes personal injury to the plaintiff or physical harm to his land or chattels, the harm is normally
different in kind . . . and the tort action may be maintained.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821C cmt. d (A.L.I. 2020)). See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 88 (4th ed. 1971) (“[C]ourts have not always found it at all easy to determine
what is sufficient ‘particular damage’ to support [a] private action [for public nuisance], and
some rather fine lines have been drawn in the decisions.”).
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and they can be separated with tolerable clarity from other classes of
affected plaintiffs.”80 Clearly uncomfortable with the perception of
fishermen as a special class, the comments in the Third Restatement
plead that “[d]escribing this state of affairs as a ‘fishermen’s exception,’ or explaining it on the ground that fishermen are ‘favorites of
admiralty,’ is unfortunate and best avoided.”81 But, as of yet, no other
class has proven as capable of consistent recovery, and thus, in practice, fishermen seem to benefit from special principles allowing recovery, while non-fishermen are turned away by courts’ invocation of the
limiting liability rationale.
My contention here is that the “special injury” requirement should
be reframed, with a focus not on its effect as a limitation on liability,
but guided by the necessity to incentivize enforcement for injuries that
are “distinct in kind” in the sense that they represent potentially widespread, significant harms otherwise unaddressed, leading to under-deterrence of tortfeasors. The special injury requirement would thereby
“channel” liability for situations in which there is a significant loss
concentrated on a particular party. The aim should be to find a “class
of victims most immediately and obviously affected by”82 the violation
of a public right (broadly conceived),83 incentivize this class of persons
to sue the tortfeasor, who must thereby internalize the social costs of
its actions, and thus realize tort law’s objective of allocative efficiency
in the case of economic or business torts.
The main challenge is to identify a first tier of the most significantly
impacted plaintiffs to come forward in cases involving widespread financial harms. Relevant to this inquiry is the desire to avoid multitudinous actions leading to multiple recovery and thus over-deterrence.
As a historical matter, the “special injury” requirement for public nuisance was intended to exclude large numbers of small claims by
achieving appropriate deterrence through direct administrative actions.84 William Blackstone noted in his Commentaries that a public
80. RTT: LEH § 8 cmt. d.
81. Id. § 7 cmt. e (“Referring to the result as a ‘fisherman’s exception’ to the rule of this
Section is again misleading.”); see also id. § 8 cmt. d (“Courts occasionally view these patterns
together and infer the existence of a ‘fishermen’s rule’ exempting that class from the usual rules
governing recovery for economic loss. The inference is faulty.”).
82. Id. § 8 cmt. d.
83. See supra note 30 (rejecting Professor Epstein’s narrow definition of infringement of public right).
84. See Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1536) (“[E]ach nuisance done in the
King’s highway is punishable in the Leet and not by an action, unless it be where one man has
suffered greater hurt or inconvenience than the generality have; but he who has suffered such
greater displeasure or hurt can have an action to recover the damage which he has by reason of
this special hurt.”).
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nuisance is usually not privately actionable because “it would be unreasonable to multiply suits by giving every man a separate right of
action.”85 In the modern era, however, it is critical to consider the
need for enforcement against the types of widespread financial harms
in which there are not likely to be physical injuries (such as data
breaches).86
b. The “Stranger” Economic Loss Rule for Negligence Revisited
Instead of being justified as a means of preventing unlimited liability, the “stranger” ELR —as embraced in 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet
Foods, Southern California Gas, and the Third Restatement—would
likewise need to be reframed pursuant to the “channeling” rationale.
Indeed, Professor Ward Farnsworth (Reporter for the Third Restatement) defended the “stranger” ELR as a mechanism to reduce the
number of potential suits, in effect by channeling tort liability through
a small class of plaintiffs, typically those who have suffered physical
injury.87 Professor Farnsworth built upon the earlier channeling justification proposed by Mario Rizzo, who emphasized how the property
owner who recovers losses can then reimburse the contractors and
others for their increased costs of completion under contract.88 But,
85. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS
167 (1893).
86. For this reason, Professor Farnsworth’s channeling rationale for ELR falls short as it is
premised on the existence of someone with physical injury or property damage coming forward.
See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 566.
87. See id. (defending the stranger economic loss rule as an all or nothing search for a “best
plaintiff” who can bring suit and properly disincentivize future negligence: ideally, the best plaintiff will be one who has been physically harmed, and if no such party exists, only plaintiffs with
viable public nuisance claims can possibly serve to deter future recurrence of the damage-inducing conduct).
88. Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281,
283–85 (1982). Rizzo was responding to Bishop’s argument that the economic loss rule made
sense in light of the fact that economic losses often represent private losses, but not social losses,
as money is simply transferred from one party to another. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in
Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1982). For example, when a restaurant located on an
island loses money when customers are not able to reach it via a bridge that is negligently destroyed, these private losses to the restaurant are offset by gains to other restaurants on the
mainland who benefit from additional patrons, now not able to cross the bridge.
Rizzo instead argues that liability should be denied when the litigation costs exceed the value
of permitting recovery. Rizzo, supra note 88, at 283. He argues for what he terms “channeling”
contracts, creating guidelines for generally denying recovery when there are contracting parties
to incentivize negotiating parties to indemnify one another and allocate risks themselves. Id. at
291–97. Rizzo argues for allowing for recovery when economic losses are concentrated—given
that this limits liability and keeps litigation costs contained, and denying recovery when channeling contracts could have been made ex ante at relatively low cost. Id. at 285.
Rizzo’s explanation is subject to the objection that one has never seen a contract used to
spread the losses back to the ultimate injured persons, which is too costly to do. See, e.g., Robert
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whereas Professor Farnsworth defends the status quo “no-duty” stranger ELR, the channeling rationale should allow for recovery in this
realm, in line with the reformulation of the “special injury” public nuisance requirement for a subclass of significantly impacted plaintiffs,
whose claims must be brought forward in order to adequately deter
the tortfeasor.
The doctrinal holding of the much-disparaged People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corporation could be justified on such
a reformulated channeling rationale.89 In People Express Airlines, a
chemical leak at a railroad yard led to the evacuation of the airline’s
nearby Newark airline terminal, leading to a business shut-down.90
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a duty of care on the part
of the railroad to take reasonable measures to avoid causing purely
economic damage to “particularly foreseeable” plaintiffs comprising
an identifiable class that the railroad knows or has reason to know are
likely to suffer from its conduct.91 According to the court, a defendant
that breaches this duty is liable for economic losses that are proximately caused by its breach of duty. This puts the onus on defendants
to take greater care in handling their activities.
While the court in People Express Airlines does not analyze the case
formally as a public nuisance case, the court looks for guidance to
both special relationship exceptions to the “stranger” ELR in negligence and to the special injury requirement in the public nuisance
context.92 The court uses examples from each of these lines of jurisJ. Rhee, A Production Theory of Pure Economic Loss, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 67 (2010)
(“[Rizzo’s] explanation does not fit the data. Most cases of pure economic loss involve high
contracting costs because the parties are strangers.”). His view also does not explain why the
measure of damages does not include an allowance for the loss of third parties who are allowed
recovery. Yet, it would be better to give the windfall to the plaintiff for deterrence purposes than
to leave it with the defendant, who now does not bear the full costs of his harm-producing
conduct.
89. The Third Restatement Reporter’s Note seeks to marginalize the People Express minority
position. RTT: LEH § 7 reporter’s note a (“Contrary positions have been taken only occasionally in the case law.” (citing People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107
(N.J. 1985); Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson C., 743 P.2d 356, 359 (Alaska 1987))). As Professor
Robert Rabin aptly put it: decades after the demise of the airline that gave the case its name,
People Express remains “a lonely outpost.” Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the
Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006). Its relatively ad hoc standard,
embodied in a fact-intensive “particular foreseeability” test, has been avoided by other courts
with—as Professor Rabin put it — “a striking degree of unanimity.” Id.
90. People Express Airlines, Inc., 495 A.2d at 108.
91. Id. at 118 (“[A] defendant who has breached his duty of care to avoid the risk of economic
injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic losses that are
proximately caused by its breach of duty”.).
92. Id. at 112 (“One group of exceptions is based on the ‘special relationship’ between the
tortfeasor and the individual or business deprived of economic expectations.”); id. at 113 (“A
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prudence to support its use of a “particular foreseeability” standard
for recovery in negligence. Additionally, it uses these examples to criticize a blanket no-duty rule, prohibiting any recovery for purely economic losses, stating “these exceptions expose the hopeless artificiality
of the per se rule against recovery for economic losses.”93
The court’s approach could be better defended on channeling
grounds. The channeling insight is that those few entities in the first
tier that suffer substantial economic loss, like the airline in People Express Airlines, may recover, while the multitude of others in second
and third tiers whose losses are increasingly indirect (e.g., customers)
cannot. Moreover, the concern about infinite extension of liability
seems misplaced here, for one can easily stop with significant claims
brought by the first tier of impacted entities (like People Express),
and tell the passengers of People Express (in the second or third tier
of impacted entities) who have to reroute that their inconvenience is
part of life, like thunderstorms and blackouts. The remedy allowed
here “channels” liability for situations in which there are significant
losses—even if purely financial losses—concentrated on particular
parties in much the same way as allowing, in the context of public
nuisances, private claims where “special injury” can be shown.
Moreover, the holding in Southern California Gas might also be reframed on these channeling terms. Justice Cuéllar emphasized the limitation of liability rationale when denying the merchants’ actions for
lost profits.94 But the problem with this approach is that it could result
in under-deterrence given the total harm in question. Looked at
through the channeling lens—whether framed as an economic loss/
negligence or public nuisance cause of action—the key questions to
ask are: Who are the “immediate and obvious” victims of the gas
leak? Does deputizing the first tier of plaintiffs—namely those who
have suffered either personal injuries or property damages—suffice
for deterrence purposes? Are the marginal gains from expanding the
circle of plaintiffs to the next tier of impacted victims worth the higher
administrative costs that multiple actions for lost profits entail?
As an initial cut, the first tier of impacted victims should include
individuals who were forced to relocate as well as public entities that
incurred expenses responding to the leak. Whether or not the remaining businesses (i.e., the plaintiffs in Southern California Gas) should
recover should depend upon whether they are necessary as additional
very solid exception allowing recovery for economic losses has also been created in cases akin to
private actions for public nuisance.”).
93. Id. at 114.
94. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
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enforcers. In making this determination, it is appropriate for judges to
consider the extent to which other harmed parties (including private
and public entities) have already come forward to force the tortfeasor
to internalize the total social harms. Relevant to this inquiry is the fact
(which emerges at the tail end of Justice Cuéllar’s opinion) that fifty
thousand claimants in related litigation brought forth claims for property damage.95 It is also worth considering whether any shortfall in
deterrence has been (or is likely to be) met by regulatory fines against
the defendant, which do not entail payments to the plaintiffs.96 Indeed, this was likewise the case in Southern California Gas.97
B. “Vicarious Avengers” for “Derivative Harms”: A Historical
Perspective
A channeling or enforcement rationale has deep roots in the emergence of early historical business torts. Consider, for example, the tort
of intentional interference with prospective advantage, available to
plaintiffs whose prospective financially advantageous transaction with
a third party (with whom they do not have a contract) was interfered
with by some unlawful means (like fraud or physical force). Tarleton
v. M’Gawley,98 an 18th century English case, provides a dramatic and
illuminating example. In that case, the defendant fired shots from one
ship, the Othello, to prevent the indigenous people from trading with
merchants on another ship, the Bannister, giving rise to recognition of
tortious liability for unlawful interference with prospective advantage,
where there is clearly “an intention not to permit any to trade” with
the claimant, using unlawful means.99
If such deliberate interference were tolerated, enormous socially
beneficial gains from trade would be lost. Conduct involving force or
fraud has long been regarded as suspect at common law; thus, the only
issue is who brings the cause of action and receives the remedy. Typi95. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty., 441 P.3d 881, 895–96 (Cal. 2019) (“[W]e recognize
Plaintiffs’ concern that SoCalGas’s alleged negligent behavior will go insufficiently deterred if
we deny recovery here. But SoCalGas is not getting off scot-free. At oral argument, the company represented that some 50,000 claimants have alleged in other litigation that they suffered
property damage caused by the leak—several hundred of whom are local businesses.”).
96. Note that, once such fines are collected, the government could establish a compensation
fund.
97. S. Cal. Gas Co., 441 P.3d at 896 (“[T]he company has spent some $450 million on remedial
measures and agreed to pay another $120 million as part of a settlement with local authorities.
SoCalGas, operating in a heavily regulated domain, also remains under investigation—and may
face further consequences in the future.”).
98. 170 Eng. Rep. 153, 153 (K.B. 1793); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M.
SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1175–78 (12th ed. 2020).
99. Tarleton, 170 Eng. Rep. at 153.
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cally, customers simply do not have a sufficient stake to fight against
the conduct and thereby restrain the aggressive defendant, when they
do not themselves suffer physical injury or property damage, even if
their economic losses are real. The directly-threatened consumers
have little stake in bringing the action at issue, because the size of the
individual consumer surplus that they would have reaped from the
relevant transaction is likely to be individually small (though significant when considered across all consumers). In the absence of all of
them banding together in a class-action lawsuit, and the coordination
costs that would involve, the more efficient solution is to confer a direct action on the seller, whose aggregate producer surplus lost is
great enough to incentivize the bringing of the action at issue, thus
essentially vindicating tort law’s attempts to restore allocative
efficiency.
Given that the indigenous people in Tarleton may not have had any
desire (or ability) to sue for the wrongful acts of the defendant, the
defendant could continue to take wrongful and socially wasteful actions. The suit must be brought by the disappointed trader, or it will
not be brought at all. The onus is on traders to sue for the public good
as well as for their own economic advantage. Essentially the tort can
be viewed as allowing traders to sue in a derivative way, basing their
harm primarily on the “unlawful” means used to cause harm to others,
with whom they would have contracted. Allowing the trader to sue is
thus driven primarily by enforcement and deterrence goals. To be
sure, the cause of action compensates the trader for the harm it suffered, but the cause of action is most needed to deter the defendant
from unlawful activities.
In a similar vein, consider the unfair competition or “passing off”
business tort.100 The passing off action builds from the proposition
that a disappointed buyer has an action against the seller who has
passed off its own goods as the superior product of a rival.101 As with
intentional interference with prospective advantage, the ultimate victims (the end consumers) are not in a position to enforce the rules of
competition because their individual harms are typically marginal
(though potentially quite large as a class). Nor would a suit by end
consumers vindicate the interests of the rival in its own product’s reputation and goodwill. In recognizing the “passing off” cause of action,
tort law relies on rival competitors to bring suit to reinforce the
proper rules of competition. The claim is that the defendant has
100. EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 98, at 1220–21; see also Catherine Romero Wright,
Reverse Passing Off: Preventing Healthy Competition, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 758, 788 (1997).
101. EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 98, at 1220–21.
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falsely represented that its own product is better than it really is, by
pretending its product is the plaintiff’s, or by claiming that its product
has desirable attributes associated with the plaintiff’s product that it,
in fact, lacks. The defendant’s misrepresentations induce third parties
to desert the plaintiff; the measure of damages is the profits from lost
sales, which depend critically on the fraction of defendant’s buyers
that would have migrated to the plaintiff’s wares if the passing off had
not happened.
There is a close kinship between actions for unfair competition and
those for violation of the Lanham Act, the trademark statute.102 The
Lanham Act makes actionable “the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in . . . commerce . . . [and] protect[s] persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition.”103 The statutory scheme put
into place by the Lanham Act undid Judge Learned Hand’s restrictive
ruling in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.104 which held that,
pursuant to traditional common law, an aggrieved competitor could
not sue as “a vicarious avenger of the defendant’s customers.” The
Lanham Act more broadly recognizes rights against a false designation of origin or any false description or representation in favor of any
rival competitor that believes it is likely to be damaged.105 With the
Lanham Act, Congress encouraged commercial firms to act as “vicarious avengers” of consumers’ rights.106
C. The Illinois Brick Indirect Purchaser Rule for Antitrust Claims:
A Modern Perspective
Moving to modern perspectives on judicially created rules implementing the “channeling” function, consider the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent move (in Apple Inc. v Pepper) to recognize antitrust
claims notwithstanding the backdrop of the restrictive Illinois Brick107
indirect purchaser rule.
In 1977, the Supreme Court announced the rule that indirect purchasers—who, unlike direct purchasers, do not buy the relevant prod102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2018).
103. Id. § 1127.
104. 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev’d on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). For further
discussion, see EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 98, at 1221–22.
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018).
106. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 98, at 1221–22. But see Rebecca Tushnet, Running
the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305,
1377 (2011) (“We let competitors sue, and not consumers, under section 43(a)(1)(B) because we
think competitors have their own interests to protect . . . A competitor in a Lanham Act suit
does not act as a ‘vicarious avenger of the public’s right to be protected against false advertising.’ ” (quoting Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 1990)).
107. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977).
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uct directly from the alleged violator, but instead from somewhere
down the supply chain—do not have standing to sue for damages
under federal antitrust law.108 The Court reasoned that not only would
it be far too difficult for the state and local governmental plaintiffs to
trace their damages through a convoluted supply chain (which involved layers of contractors and sub-contractors), but that recovery
presented a grave risk of subjecting the defendants to multiple suits.109
Thus, for the sake of simplicity and efficiency, the Court drew a clear
line, barring indirect purchasers from pursuing money damages in antitrust actions.110
Although conventionally viewed as a line-drawing exercise designed
to preclude unlimited liability (like the ELR), the “channeling” rationale provides a richer theoretical justification, one prone to evolve in
modern contexts to satisfy enforcement and deterrence goals. The
Court’s Apple Inc. v. Pepper111 decision highlights this capacity for
evolution. In a sharply divided 5-4 opinion, the Court held that iPhone
users who bought apps on Apple’s App Store constitute “direct purchasers” vis-à-vis Apple, notwithstanding the fact that they technically
purchased the apps from third-party app developers.112 In rejiggering
the restrictive Illinois Brick rule to enable recovery, the Court was
guided by an enforcement rationale—evincing concern that a contrary
holding would “provide a roadmap . . . to evade antitrust claims by
consumers and thereby thwart effective antitrust enforcement.”113
The Court’s decision could have far-reaching implications for the
platform economy and entities that offer services on the Internet using vendors or other suppliers. It is also a key example of the Court
wielding an enforcement or channeling rationale in order to modify a
restrictive judicial rule designed (like the ELR) to stave off the prospect of multiplicity of suits.
108. Id. at 746–47.
109. Id. at 730–33.
110. Id. at 746–47. Note that, in reality, the line-drawing was not quite so clean and simple:
Indirect purchasers can and do sue in federal court, including for damages, under the laws of the
many states (more than 30) that have refused to apply the Illinois Brick rule to their own state
antitrust law. Additionally, courts have recognized certain exceptions to the bar against indirect
purchaser standing. Alexander Kristofcak, FCA v. FDA: The Case Against the Presumption of
Immateriality from Agency Inaction, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 (2020).
111. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019).
112. Id. at 1521.
113. Id. at 1523. The majority’s reasoning prompted a vociferous dissent, which noted that, as
a doctrinal matter, the iPhone users were suing under “exactly the kind of ‘pass-on theory’ Illinois Brick rejected.” Id. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent forewarned that
the decision would simply prod Apple to enter into “less efficient” contractual arrangements
with its app developers to avoid liability under the antitrust laws. Id. at 1530.
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PUBLIC NUISANCE

In a spate of recent cases, various public and private entities have
sued pharmacies and opiate manufacturers and distributors. Across
the board, the complaints in these cases allege that the opioid epidemic constitutes a public nuisance. How might we apply insights
gleaned from the unifying “channeling” theory for “special injury”
public nuisance and the ELR to these cases?
A. A Patchwork of Existing Doctrinal Approaches
1. The Application of the ELR to Public Nuisance
As described above, some courts apply the ELR to public nuisance
claims, while others do not.114 The ELR has not featured so prominently in the opioid cases. The New York and Massachusetts state
courts have held that the ELR only bars tort actions between contracting parties.115 The federal multi-district litigation (MDL) is located in Ohio, which applies the ELR to “qualified” public nuisances
(which mirror negligence torts) but not “absolute” public nuisances
(involving intentional acts or statutory violations).116 But, given that
public nuisance is a state tort, it is likely that each underlying state’s
approach would be at play.
2. The “Special Injury” Requirement
The majority view seems to be that governmental entities do not
need to show special injury to bring a public nuisance claim, but such
public entities can generally only seek abatement (not damages).117
114. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., In re Opioid Litig., 2018 WL 3115102, at *35 (No. 4000/2017) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 18, 2018) (stating that the economic loss rule only bars tort actions between contracting
parties, and because there is no contract here, there is no economic loss rule issue); City of
Boston v. Purdue Pharma, 2020 WL 416406, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2020) (“[T]he Cities
seek damages for a myriad of public costs that they allege they have been forced to expend to
combat an opioid epidemic. Because the claims are not contract-related, the economic loss doctrine does not apply.”).
116. In the negligence context, the ELR only applies to claims arising between contracting
parties:
The economic loss rule recognizes that the risk of consequential economic loss is something that the parties can allocate by agreement when they enter a contract. This allocation of risk is not possible where, as here, the harm alleged is caused by involuntary
interactions between a tortfeasor and a plaintiff.
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2018 WL 6628898, at *19 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
117. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 452 F. Supp. 3d 745, 773–74, (N.D. Ohio
2020) (finding that, unlike the government entity plaintiffs in the MDL, a private medical center
had to show special injury to assert a public nuisance claim); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731(a)
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That said, there is no uniform doctrinal rule; instead, inconsistency
abounds across courts, whose decisions consider a range of factors.
For example, in a high-profile global warming case in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Professor Richard Epstein, as amicus, assumed that municipalities such as New York City would need to
show special injury; the city contested this. However, neither side marshalled case law support for its respective contrary positions.118
It is nonetheless conventionally accepted that a public entity does
not have to show special injury to bring a public nuisance claim, at
least when seeking an injunction.119 It is likewise broadly accepted
that public entities may seek injunctions and abatement, but not monetary damages.120 Some courts nonetheless allow for recovery of costs
(West 2011) (offering abatement as the only remedy for public entities bringing public nuisance
claims).
118. Professor Epstein suggests that New York City’s claim for public nuisance should fail
given that it cannot show special injury. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Richard A. Epstein in
Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2188
at 3 (2d. Cir. Feb. 14, 2019) (Doc. No. 188). He argues that allowing New York City to proceed
will lead to an unwanted avalanche of litigation. Id. at 2; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Competitive Enterprise Institute at 7, Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, Appeal No.
118,474 (Okla. Oct. 22, 2020) (arguing that “absent a claim to special damages, diffuse harms
[are] appropriately redressed through regulatory action,” not through liability for public nuisance). In reply, New York City insists (albeit in a footnote) that, as a public entity, it need not
show special injury. It points to 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet, which states that “[a] public nuisance is actionable by a private person only if it is shown that the person suffered special injury
beyond that suffered by the community at large.” Corrected Reply Brief at 28 n.10, City of New
York v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2019) (Doc. No. 215) (quoting 532 Madison
Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (N.Y. 2001)).
In New York, it is clear that public entities can bring public nuisance claims seeking a remedy
of abatement. See Copart Indus. Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977) (“A
public, or as sometimes termed a common, nuisance is an offense against the State and is subject
to abatement or prosecution on application of the proper governmental agency.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); City of New York v. Smokes-Spirit.Com Inc., 911 N.E.2d 834,
841 (N.Y. 2009) (“It is well settled that a governmental entity, such as the City, may bring an
action to abate a public nuisance . . .”). However, whether a public entity can bring a claim for
damages in New York is unclear. In the Smokes-Spirits case, the court does not say one way or
another, but the plaintiff entity did seek reimbursement for the costs of abating the public nuisance, and the court did not indicate that such a request was improper. Id. at 837.
119. Cox v. New Castle Cty., 265 A.2d 26, 27 (Del. 1970) (allowing a claim brought by the
county seeking the abatement of a public nuisance to go forward with no mention of special
injury). See City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 321 N.E.2d 412, 419 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974) (allowing for public nuisance claim seeking injunction by city to move forward with no
mention of special injury); City of Omaha v. Danner, 185 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Neb. 1971) (specifically stating that due to the city’s statutory authority to suppress nuisances that “[t]he Legislature has impliedly empowered plaintiff to obtain a decree in equity abating a public nuisance
without special damage to plaintiff.”). See also Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726
F. Supp. 371, 373 (D. Conn. 1989) (The town brought public nuisance claim seeking injunction
with no mention of special injury limitation.).
120. Section 731 of the California Code of Civil Procedure specifically states that private parties can recover damages for public nuisances, but abatement is the only remedy specifically
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associated with abatement. In People v. ConAgra Grocery Products,
various public entities brought a public nuisance claim against a lead
paint manufacturer.121 The public entities prevailed and were granted
an abatement.122 Notably, their recovery included an “abatement
fund” of more than $1 billion to pay for the cost of removing the lead
paint from the affected buildings.123 So, while the city was not technically awarded damages, the cost of abating the nuisance was put entirely on the shoulders of the tortfeasor.124 Similarly, the court in State
of Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma ordered the defendant opioid manufacturers to pay $465 million to fund a statewide opioid epidemic
abatement plan.125 The State had not shown special injury, only that
the defendant’s misleading marketing of dangerous and addictive
drugs “annoy[ed], injure[d] or endanger[ed] the comfort, repose,
health, or safety of others” in a way that affected a considerable number of persons.126
But what if a public entity demonstrates “special injury”? Would it
then be allowed to seek monetary damages? If a public entity brings a
public nuisance claim alleging harm to its own property or interests—
as opposed to the community interest generally—some courts will
treat the public entity akin to a private individual who must show special injury to receive damages. In City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore
& Co., a lead paint public nuisance case, the Supreme Court of Missouri explained:
Although the city characterizes its suit as one for an injury to the
public health and suggests that it is for this injury that it is suing, this
mentioned that public entities can seek. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 2011). Additionally,
California cases have held that public entities cannot recover abatement costs or damages even
for public nuisances where the public entity can show special injury. See Torrance Redev.
Agency v. Solvent Coating Co., 763 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1991); see also e.g., In re Lead
Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502 (N.J. 2007) (holding a city to be a private plaintiff by virtue of the
remedy requested).
121. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
122. Id. at 525, 549.
123. Id. at 568–71.
124. Other cases suggest that sometimes a public entity can succeed in having the courts force
tortfeasors to pay for the costs of abating a public nuisance. See Lane v. City of Mt. Vernon, 342
N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976) (“Moreover, it has long been recognized that when a local government, in the proper exercise of its delegated powers, summarily abates a public nuisance, it may
compel the owner of the property involved to bear the cost of abatement.”); Chow v. Kshel
Realty Corp., 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2094, at *45 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“Having violated sections 27-127 and 27-128 of the Administrative Code, the Kshel Defendants’ conduct constituted
a public nuisance under section 7-703(d), entitling the City to reimbursement for funds spent
demolishing the Building.”).
125. Final Judgement After Non-Jury Trial, Oklahoma ex. rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. CJ-2017-816, at 41–42 (Dist. Ct. Cleveland Cty. Okla., Nov. 15, 2019).
126. Id. at 21–22 (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 50, §§ 1–2 (1981)).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\70-2\DPL202.txt

460

unknown

Seq: 30

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

13-DEC-21

10:52

[Vol. 70:431

is not the case. The damages it seeks are in the nature of a private
tort action for the costs the city allegedly incurred abating and
remediating lead paint in certain, albeit numerous, properties. In
this way, the city’s claims are like those of any plaintiff seeking particularized damages allegedly resulting from a public nuisance. The
city, therefore, must meet the same causation standard as must
other nuisance claimants and must show specific and particularized
harm from the public nuisance of lead paint, different in kind from
the harm to the rest of the community.127

But does this differential treatment of public and private plaintiffs
make sense? As Professor Thomas Merrill argued:
If public nuisance is a single cause of action—as the [Second] Restatement implicitly insists—and private parties can in some circumstances obtain damages under this cause of action, what possible
argument supports the conclusion that public officials cannot obtain
damages? At the same time, if public nuisance is a single cause of
action, and public officials cannot obtain damages, what possible argument supports awarding damages to private parties for the same
violation?128

In support of his argument that public nuisance should not be a tort,
Merrill asked: “If the undifferentiated interference with the public
right means that it is not feasible to calculate damages, why carve out
an exception for a subclass of the public that can show some impossible-to-define higher-than-normal damages?”129
To date, there is no consistent approach to the special injury requirement in opioids litigation. The complaints of all three Ohio counties in the first track of the federal MDL state that they have suffered
special injury, even though they seek abatement rather than compen127. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. 2007). The court
held that no recovery was permitted because the city could not show actual causation between
the company and the lead paint harms alleged. Id. at 115, 117 (“[A]ctual causation can be established only by identifying the defendant who made or sold that product . . . The trial court did
not err in entering summary judgment against the city based on its inability to provide any product identification evidence.”).
Likewise, in State v. General Electric Co., the court stated:
To satisfy the “special injury” requirement in this case and establish any entitlement to
compensatory damages on their common-law public nuisance claim, the Plaintiffs must
show that the State has suffered some discrete physical harm or pecuniary loss apart
from the more generalized injury to the public’s interest that results from the public
nuisance, here the contamination of public groundwater at South Valley by hazardous
substances . . . Absent proof of some discrete “special injury” to the State’s interest
apart from the injury to the public’s interest in unappropriated groundwater, Plaintiffs
may be limited to equitable relief seeking the abatement of the claimed nuisance.
335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1240–41 (D.N.M. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
128. Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. ii, 18 (2011). Professor
Merrill also uses this contradiction to note that the special injury requirement allowing for damages is a way to get around the economic loss rule. Id. at 18–19.
129. Id.
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satory damages.130 Both the New York and Oklahoma opioids complaints, by contrast, make no mention of special injury, nor do they
request damages; both seek an abatement and the creation of an
abatement fund to pay for the costs.131 In the Massachusetts complaint, there is likewise no mention of special injury, even though the
state seeks compensatory damages for the nuisance.132
B. A Unified “Channeling” Approach
Plaintiffs in the opioids federal MDL include mostly public entities
(municipalities and Native American tribes), but also some private entities (third-party payors and hospitals).133 One such private plaintiff,
the West Boca Medical Center, has framed its business losses due to
the opioid epidemic simultaneously as claims for negligence and public nuisance perpetrated by various opioid distributors, pharmacies,
and manufacturers.
130. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 1074, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2019) (“Plaintiff has suffered, and
will continue to suffer, unique harms as described . . . which are of a different kind and degree
than Ohio citizens at large. These are harms that can only be suffered by Plaintiff.”); Complaint
¶ 314, City of Cleveland v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., No. 1:18-op-45132-DAP, (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 6, 2018) (“The Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Community have sustained specific and special
injuries because its damages include, inter alia, health services, law enforcement expenditures,
and emergency services.”); Corrected Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 1031, In
Re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:18-op-45090-DAP (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2018) (stating
that the county suffered “unique harms . . . which are of a different kind and degree than Ohio
citizens at large.”).
131. Complaint ¶¶ 74–78, People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 400016/2018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 14, 2018); Original Petition of State of Oklahoma at ¶¶ 116–20, Oklahoma v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816 (Dist. Ct. Cleveland Cty. Okla., Nov. 15, 2019).
132. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 901–10, Commonwealth v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 1884-cv-01808 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Jan. 31, 2019). The state does request compensatory damages in its prayer for relief, in addition to abatement and reimbursement for the state’s
costs of efforts undertaken to abate the nuisance. This suit is brought by the Attorney General
via its parens patriae power. The nuisance claim itself is mainly tied to “deceptive marketing” by
the opioid manufacturers, and that marketing led to public health injuries. The state seeks a
remedy of abatement and the recovery of costs that the state has expended dealing with the
opioid crisis. Additionally, the state lists among the injuries from the public nuisance “(b) health
care costs for individuals, children, families, employers, the Commonwealth, and its subdivisions;
(c) loss of productivity and harm to the economy of the Commonwealth; and (d) special public
costs borne solely by the Commonwealth in its efforts to abate the nuisance and to support the
public health, safety, and welfare.” Id. ¶ 906 (emphasis added). Thus, while special injury is not
directly mentioned in the complaint, this bolded section certainly seems to be gesturing towards
it.
133. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 452 F. Supp. 3d 745, 773–74, (N.D. Ohio 2020)
(“Although most of [the actions in this MDL], Summit County, Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and
Blackfeet Tribe, involve governmental entities, at least one action, Cleveland Bakers, was
brought by a private plaintiff.”).
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The West Boca Medical Center is a 195-bed, acute care hospital in
Palm Beach County, Florida which is “in the business of providing a
service.”134 According to West Boca Medical Center, hospitals such as
itself in Southern Florida have been hit especially hard by the opioid
epidemic. It alleges that the opioid epidemic constitutes a public nuisance: “[t]he nuisance is the over-saturation of opioids in the patient
population of [West Boca Medical Center] and in the geographic area
served by [West Boca Medical Center] . . ., as well as the adverse
social, economic, and human health outcomes associated with widespread illegal opioid use.”135
Typifying the conventional doctrinal approach, Judge Dan Polster
determined that the public entity plaintiffs, unlike private parties,
need not show special injury in the federal MDL.136 West Boca Medical Center, conversely, as a private plaintiff, had to demonstrate “special injury” to recover under public nuisance.137 Judge Polster invoked
the conventional “different in kind” standard for special injury: the
hospital must assert a “special or peculiar injury to an individual different in kind and not merely in degree from the injury to the public
at large.”138 Judge Polster declined to dismiss the hospital’s public nuisance claim, finding that it sufficiently alleged that it “sustained concrete economic losses differing in kind from the generalized injury to
public health, safety, and wellness suffered by the general public as a
consequence of the multi-faceted opioid crisis.”139
The West Boca Medical Center case provides an opportunity to
consider this Article’s proposed new approach of reconciling the special injury public nuisance requirement and exceptions to the ELR in
negligence actions via the lens of channeling liability. In the suit, the
hospital alleges three different kinds of business injuries stemming
from the opioid epidemic: (1) unreimbursed charges for medical treatment of patients with opioid conditions (or conditions exacerbated by
opioid use); (2) increased operational costs for providing more com134. Id. at 758–59, 768.
135. Id. at 773.
136. Id. at 773–74 (Certain aspects of public nuisance law, including standing to bring a claim,
differ when claims are asserted by private parties such as Plaintiffs.).
137. Id. at 774 (“Florida, like Ohio, follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, so in order for
West Boca to have standing to assert a public nuisance claim, it must assert a ‘special or peculiar
injury to an individual different in kind and not merely in degree from the injury to the public at
large.’ ” (quoting Brown v. Fla. Chautauqua Ass’n, 52 So. 802, 803 (Fla. 1910)).
138. Id. (quoting Brown, 52 So. at 803); see also id. at 806 (“[S]ustained concrete economic
losses [differ] in kind from the generalized injury to public health, safety, and wellness suffered
by the general public.”).
139. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 452 F. Supp. 3d at 774.
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plicated care to opioid addicts and dealing with “pill seekers”; and (3)
increased costs as a direct purchaser of opioid pills.140
With respect to the first category of claimed business losses, channeling considerations weigh against liability. Hospitals provide a service and then seek compensation from the patient. If there are
unreimbursed charges, West Boca Medical Center should seek them
from their patients. Moreover, individual patients have brought cases
included in the federal MDL seeking recovery for various damages,
including their medical bills.141 Those patients are the first tier of impacted victims and there is no reason to think that they are not adequate enforcers against these particular harms. In this instance, “the
general interest in deterring injurious conduct” is satisfied, as “directly
injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as
private attorneys general.”142 Indeed, allowing West Boca Medical
Center to enforce on its patients’ behalf could lead to over-deterrence
given the possibility of double recovery.143
But with respect to the second category of losses, channeling considerations weigh in favor of liability. The additional operational expenses incurred by West Boca Medical Center include additional
training and diagnostic tools to distinguish pill-seekers from legitimate
patients, and also the hiring of additional personnel to keep opioids
secure.144 Judge Polster refers to this category of injury as “classic business costs.”145 With respect to these direct costs, hospitals such as
West Boca Medical Center are the first-tier victims146 and, if they are
140. See id. at 763, 768 (delineating three categories of “injuries to business or property”).
141. See id. at 769 (“In this MDL alone, there are scores of cases brought by individual parties
seeking compensation for various damages, including their medical bills. If hospitals are damaged by patients not paying their medical bills, their remedy—as discussed above—should be to
seek compensation from the patients who are not paying those bills.”).
142. Id. at 767 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 270 (1992); see also id.
at 769 (“To the extent the Defendants are liable to the patients for the costs of medical bills, it
ought to be the patients’ responsibility to hold the Defendants liable as ‘private attorneys general.’ ”); id. at 769 (“In the case of unpaid medical bills, it is not entirely clear that the medical
expenses injury does not belong, in whole or in part, to the patients.”).
143. Judge Polster does refer to a “concern that allowing West Boca to pursue the first category of damages would lead to double recovery against the Defendants.” Id. at 766 n.21.
144. Id. at 760 (listing “operational costs such as ‘capital improvement costs,’ ‘additional security costs,’ and ‘additional training and educational costs for hospital personnel,’ as well as
costs associated with being falsely induced to purchase and prescribe more opioid pills than were
appropriate.”) (internal citations omitted).
145. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 452 F. Supp. 3d at 769.
146. Cf. id. (describing the hospital’s operational expenses as “direct costs to hospitals that
allegedly were borne as a result of the opioid crisis itself, not simply as a result of treating injured
patients.”).
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precluded from enforcing against such societal costs, the alleged
tortfeasors would be potentially dramatically under-deterred.147
V.

CONCLUSION: PUBLIC NUISANCE

AS

MODERN BUSINESS TORT

The public nuisance claim for recovery of significant financial losses
has emerged as the quintessential 21st century business tort.148 The
resurgence of public nuisance actions in the context of business or financial losses has provided occasion for courts to consider side-byside two doctrines that hitherto seemed unrelated: the ELR for negligence actions and the special injury rule for public nuisance actions.
A judicial consensus has emerged that these seemingly disparate doctrines are functionally united by their shared aim to limit liability in
the realm of financial losses.
The Third Restatement’s approach to business disputes involving
purely financial losses—sharply curtailing negligence actions but providing an escape hatch via public nuisance—has fueled litigants’ strategy of using public nuisance as an end run around the ELR in
negligence. The “special injury” requirement has emerged as the core
doctrinal distinction between a viable public nuisance claim and a
barred negligence interference with economic relations tort.
This Article contends that the “special injury” requirement should
be reframed, with a focus not on its effect as a limitation on liability,
but guided by the necessity to incentivize enforcement for injuries that
are “distinct in kind” in the sense that they would otherwise not be
enforced against, leading to under-deterrence. The special injury requirement would thereby “channel” liability for situations in which
there are significant concentrated losses—including purely financial
losses—on particular parties, just as the ELR does in the negligence
context.

147. Id. at 760. It is less clear that hospitals are needed to enforce against the third category of
harms. While, as direct purchasers of opioid pills, hospitals “were direct targets of the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations,” they presumably passed along these additional costs to patients in the form of higher medical bills. Id.
148. But see Amicus Curiae Brief of Competitive Enterprise Institute at 8, Oklahoma ex rel.
Hunter v. Johnson & Johnson, Appeal No. 118,474 (Okla. Oct. 22, 2020) (arguing that “the
interests in lands, air or water protected by the law of nuisance are identical for both private and
public nuisance” and noting that, historically, “[n]either head of nuisance has ever covered financial losses . . .”).

